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THE INTERESTS OF EAST AFRICA 
IN AN INTERNATIONAL TEA AGREEMENT (ITA) 
By 
G.P, Tyler 
ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a simple econometric model of the international 
trade in tea and describes the advantages and disadvantages to East African 
producers of various possible International Tea Agreements, as compared with 
a situation in which no agreement is reached and production continues unre-
strained. 
As of 1976, East Africa accounted for a small but rapidly expanding 
sector of world tea production, and, although tea prices have been falling 
for more than a decade, total revenue earned by tea in East Africa has 
continued to rise because the volume of exports has risen more rapidly than 
the decline in prices. However, It appears that East Africa could earn even 
higher revenues from tea if an international agreement could be reached which 
would not limit the region's share of world production too severely, If 
increased tea production were limited In such a way that the three major Asian 
producers, India, Sri Lanka and Indonesia, maintained their present absolute 
levels of tea production, and the new producers shared all the natural 
expansion of demand for tea, this would still allow Kenya and East Africa an 
attractive rate of increase of exports and revenue. The employment conse-
quences in Kenya of a limitation on the growth of production according to 
this formula are not necessarily negative, and could even be positive. 
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EFFORTS TO REACH. LT_EA'AGREEMENT; BACKGROUND 
The 19 30s saw the successful application of an international commodity 
agreement to tea. Utilising the advantage of a very price inelastic demand, 
India, Ceylon, the Dutch East Indies and subsequently East Africa raised their 
export revenue from tea by organising a restriction of supply,, The price of 
tea, which had reached an inter^war low of 9.5d/lb. in 1932, had by 1937, 
with the exports of these countries cut back by 11 per cent, risen by 60 per 
cent. (6) 
High prices for tea in the early 1950s led, in 1955, to the abandon-
ment of the formal International Tea Agreement (ITA). However, as is demon-
strated in Table 1, since that price boom the real price of tea has fallen 
steadily - by two thirds in fact from 1954 to 19750 As a result, since 1965 
attempts have been made through periodic international meetings to create a 
new ITA with the aim once again of raising export earnings by restricting 
supply. However, apart from 1969 when mildly restrictive ad hoc quotas were 
agreed to, there has been no success in reaching an agreements 
This failure is epitomised by the results of the special working party 
of the subgroup of exporters on the FAO's Consultative Committee on Tea, 
which met in April 1975 to examine specific measures which could form part 
of a multidimensional tea agreement. (7) The proposals discussed were for:-
- a minimum export price scheme 
- an export quota scheme 
- co-operation In promotion 
- rationalisation of the marketing structure 
- provision of an Independent market intelligence service. 
Agreement could only be reached on the last three items, and then only to 
request further study. On the two schemes that involved a measure of export 
restraint, "the Working Party was .„. unable to make any unanimous and 
concrete recommendations.. ."<, (7, p. 5) The chief problem was "the difficulties 
that might be encountered where smallholder tea growing was being expanded" 
(ie. in East Africa). (7, p. 6) 
The same unsuccessful outcome was repeated in March 1976 at a meeting 
of Commonwealth producers held in London, which was called to discuss U.K. 
proposals for an ITA. Basically, as one commentator reported, "the African 
tea producers are opposed to any measures to restrict exports or production". 
(Financial Times. 17/3/76, p. 27) 
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Table 1. Eondofi auction average ted prices ' (new pence/kilogramme). 
Year Money Index of Real 
Price Inflation Price 
(1963=100) 
Year Money Index of Real 
Price Inflation Price 
(1963=100) 
19 51 40.2 108 117.9 1963 46.5 100 147.2 
1952 33.5 105 101.1 1964 47.2 102 146,5 
1953 40.1 100 127.0 1965 46.0 103 141.4 
1954 58.0 99 183.6 1966 CO * J- 105 135.0 
1955 55.8 99 178.4 1967 45.7 107 135.2 
1956 53.2 101 166.6 1968 43.5 122 112.9 
1957 48.8 103 149.9 1969 40.5 125 102.5 
1958 50.5 100 159.7 1970 45.7 132.5 109.2 
1959 50.0 99 160.0 1971 43.3 136.5 100.4 
1960 50.7 100 160.4 1972 42.2 143.5 93.1 
1961 48.5 99 155.4 1973 43.4 180.5 76.1 
1962 49.0 99 156.7 1974 59.8 268.5 70.6 
1975 62.4 316,5 62.4 
Sources: London average tea price is taken from the International Tea 
CommitteeAnriudI Bulletin of Statistics and a Note of the FAO 
Committee on Commodity Problems (CCPi TE 761 Inf 2); the world 
inflation index is derived from an index of the prices of all 
traded commodities given In the U.N. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. 
Note: Real prices are in 1975 relative values, and are calculated by 
setting the 1975 world Inflation index equal to one, and thus values 
for earlier years as fractions of this, and dividing the money price 
series by the new inflation series. 
A new and effective ITA has not been established, despite ten years of 
intermittent negotiation,because several important producers have not seen it 
in their interests to co-operate. 
THE POSITION OF EAST AFRICAN PRODUCERS 
Two journal articles, both produced around 1971, have attempted to 
rationalise the non-cooperative stance of East Africa at the tea talks. 
(Gwyer, 8 and Etherington , 5) Essentially, both base their arguments on the 
position that East African producers are small, but rapidly growing exporters 
for whom general export restraint may yield no net benefit. 
Table 2 sets out the relative positions of the major tea exporting 
nations in recent years. 
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Table 2. Development 'of 'the 'world t6d '6001161117, 1960 - 1973. 
India Sri Indonesia Kenya Uganda Tanza- Malawi World 
Lanka nia 
average 
exports 
1959/61 
market 
share 
204- ,356 
,380 
184,278 
, 342 
33 „952 
„Q63 
11,072 
,021 
3 ,748 
o007 
3,198 11,625 
,006 ,022 
538,050 
average 
exports 
1972/74 
market 
share 
201,272 
,293 
193,534 
,281 
41,445 
,060 
49,522 18,783 
,072 ,027 
9,426 21,893 
,014 ,032 
688,000 
-& growth 
p.a. 
59/61-72/4 
-0.1 0.3 2.9 12.2 13.2 8 . 6 5 „0 1.9 
real pri ce 
1960 
1973 
% change 
1960-73 
172.11 
80.15 
-53.4 
174.14 
79.96 
-54.1 
107.01 148.82 137,42 
n.a 78.04 73.64 
•47.6 -46.4 
138.75 115.55 
74.69 66 016 
-46.2 -42.7 
160.40 
76,10 
-52.6 
export 
revenue 
av. 1959/61 351.73 320.90 
av. 1972/74 161.31 153.95 
% change -54.1 -52.0 
59/61-72/4 
36.33 16.49 
38.64 
5.16 
13.83 
134.3 168.0 
4.43 13.42 
7.05 14.47 
59.1 7, 8 
863.03 
523.54 
-39.3 
a. Exports are in metric tonnes. 
b. Prices are London auction prices In new pence per kilogramme, 
deflated by a U,N. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics index of 
world inflation (see Table 1) with 1975 =1, thus all prices 
are in 1975 relative values. 
c. Export revenue is estimated as (total exports) x (real UK 
auction price) and is given in the table in £m. Figures are 
based on average exports for the years stated, and 1960 and 
1973 prices. 
Sources; Statistics are derived from the International Tea Committee's 
Annual Bulletin of Statistics. 
We can see that over the period 1959/61 to 1972/74, total world exports 
rose by 1.9 per cent P e r annum, but that real prices fell by 52.6 per cent,from 
160.40 p/kg. in 1960 to 76.10 in 1973. The net outcome therefore was an overall 
decline in revenue from tea of 39 per cent. This average experience, however, is 
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in complete contrast with that of East African producers. 
If we take the example of Kenya, export volume rose 12,2 per cent 
per annum, so that despite a drop of 47.6 per cent in the 'real' price of 
Kenyan tea, export revenue was still able to grow by 134 per cent over the 
period, or 6.8 per cent per annum. Thus by increasing its share of world 
exports from 3.4 per cent to 11.3 per cent, East Africa was able to reap 
significant real benefits from its growing tea industry, despite the rapid 
fall in prices. 
It appears therefore that East Africa has less need of an ITA 
than other tea - producing areas. This view is strengthened if we consider 
the case of Sri Lanka, where the export volume showed negligible increase 
and real export earnings fell by 52 per cent. 
Gwyer's argument against co-operation in an ITA rests on the 
belief that small producers are in a weak bargaining position when faced 
with pressure from both major producing and consuming countries for an 
agreement. Drawing on East Africa's experience of the International 
Coffee Agreement, Gwyer suggests that an ITA might excessively restrain the 
growth of East Africa's tea exports to the advantage of the larger Asian 
producers:-
Thus , one condition for the setting up of a commodity agreement 
seems to be a vested interest by the largest exporter of the 
commodity for a period of reduced competition, where market 
shares are determined on the basis of past export performance rather 
than current exportable supplies. (8, p. 467) 
When, as with the International Coffee Agreement, consumer countries agree to 
enforce quotas on supplying countries, small but rapidly growing producers may 
find themselves worse off, with higher prices not sufficient to compensate for 
the large reduction in exports below their potential level. Gwyer shows that 
in the 1960s Kenya and Uganda reduced the rate of growth of coffee production by 
half relative to the 1950s, while Tanzania, which increased its growth rate, 
had to divert up to 40 per cent of its exports to low priced markets outside the 
Agreement. It may even be the case that tea production expanded so fast in the 
1960s - with government support - because of the very severe restraint on 
co ffee expans ion. 
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Etherington's arguments, in contrast, are based on the view that 
small but growing exporters are in a strong bargaining position in any 
negotiations, and can therefore adopt a 'hard-line* strategy0 (Etherington 
does not consider the case of consumer - large producer collusion„) 
As demonstrated in Table 2, because East Africa's market share is 
relatively small it has the option of increasing its export revenue by a 
rapid growth of exports9 and so has less need of an ITA than Asian producers, 
who, were they to expand output rapidly, would probably force down prices 
more than in proportion to their growth of exports. Thus in order to secure 
East African agreement to any ITA? Asian producers should be prepared to 
offer attractive terms, namely a rising share in any global export quota over 
the life of the ITA to accommodate African growth plans. Indeed, Etherington 
shows by means of a sample ITA scheme that if quota shares were based on past 
export performance then the export restraint Implied for East Africa would be 
so severe that there would be no net increase in export revenue from joining 
the scheme. Thus a rising share in any global quota becomes a rational pre-
condition for East African participation in an ITA, 
It is further pointed out that lower East African production costs 
imply a greater ability to withstand further price competition in the event 
of no ITA being agreed toj that because average quality has risen, prices for 
East African tea have not fallen as much as the average (as shown in Table 2); 
and finally that increasing domestic tea consumption in India may quite likely 
lead to reduced export availability, and therefore the long-term outlook for 
a balance of world supply and demand is much more favourable than in the short 
term, Etherington concludes that for East Africa, "it would be a rational 
decision to continue the expansion of the industry", (5, p, 107) 
The Advantages of Expansion in Eas^ t Africa 
It is clear that to date the many advantages of producing tea have per-
suaded East African governments to follow policies of continued expansion 
despite the need for production restraint at the global level. 
One very important advantage of tea is that? despite the fall in real 
prices, production in East Africa has still been very profitable,, Considering 
the estate sector first, the company accounts which have been examined have 
invariably showed East African operations to be more profitable than Asian, 
To give two examples, Jokai Tea Holdings Ltd, reported pre-tax profits over 
the period 1970-74 of 4,75 p/kg for tea produced on its Assam estates, but 
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6.41 p/kg on its Malawi estates."" (10) Warren Tea Holdings Ltd. over the 
1970-73 period reported profits of 4.1 p/kg on its Indian estates, and 8.9 p/kg 
on its Kenyan estates. (15) A.fter tax the difference is even greater. In the 
case of Jokai Tea Holdings, in 1972 post-tax profits in Malawi were three times 
as great they were in India, even though the acreage under tea in India was 
four times as large as that in Malawi - implying post-tax profits per acre were 
about twelve times larger in Malawi than in India. 
The smallholder sector in Kenya has been examined by Stern. (12) He 
evaluated the Kenya Tea Development Authority's Third Plan, for the planting of 
35,000 acres of small-holder tea from 1968/9 to 1972/3. He concluded that at 
market prices the scheme had an Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of 22 per cent, 
and using the Little-Mirrlees shadow prices, an IRR of 38.8 per cent. (This 
was based, however, on the expectation of constant real tea prices at their 
1968/9 level.) 
As well as very profitable, tea is a very labour-intensive crop, both 
in its need for steady plucking and in its need for intensive care - application 
of fertiliser, weed and pest control, pruning, terracing, drainage, etc. While 
labour use varies with bush yield, about two acres will support one full man 
year, and the IL0 Mission to Kenya therefore highlighted tea in 1972 as a cash 
crop well suited to an employment orientated strategy of economic development.(9) 
Tea has also proved to be suitable (given efficient organisation) to 
small-holder cultivation, thus providing an effective means of directing cash 
incomes to small-scale, independent farmers instead of having to develop a 
purely wage-labour plantation system. By 1972/3 in Kenya, where small-holder 
production is most advanced, there were over 75,000 small holders cultivating 
over 30,000 ha. of tea and providing about one-fourth of total output, (12) 
Finally, tea production requires factory processing near the fields 
where it is grown, careful supervision of cultivation and processing, efficient 
transport networks to ensure the timely distribution of both inputs and output, 
and financial and commercial services , so that this crop provides a stimulus 
to the development of an efficient, commercially-orientated rural economy in 
general. 
Hence tea production has been earmarked for expansion, and in the past 
international agencies have helped to finance development costs. Thus in 
Kenya's Development Plan for 1974-78 one of the major goals for agriculture was 
1. These figures are unweighted averages. 
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to be "to improve the distribution of rural income by obtaining a significant 
increase in the proportion of farmers who obtain a cash income from their land", 
(11,Do 19 7) and tea expansion was to play a major role in achieving this. Tea 
was given a growth rate target of 1007 per cent per annum for 1972-78, compared 
with 2 per cent per annum for coffee. By 1978, output was planned to be 98,000 
tonnes, worth £K 24,500,000 (valued at 1972 prices) compared with £K 16,000,000 
in 19 72. The increase over the period represents 37 per cent of the total 
planned increase in marketed crop production, making tea by far the most 
important single crop in the planned growth of output and employment in the cash 
crop sector. It was hoped that by 1978 there would be 92,000 small-holders 
employing 90,000 labourers in tea production„(11, pp. 231-238) 
Effects in East Africa of Falling Tea Prices: The Disadvantages of Expansion 
The prospects for the profitable expansion of tea production depend of 
course on the expected levels of prices. In Kenya's 1974-78 Development Plan 
discussion on this point was limited to a reference to the ITA talks, and an 
expectation that "Kenya tea will continue to find a ready market in view of its 
high quality". (11, p. 238) Stern gives alternative profit calculations In the 
event of price changes. With a shadow wage rate of 0.6 of the market wage, 
Stern's results are that the IRR on the smallholder projects falls from 39.7 
per cent to 31.1 per cent if prices fall to 20 per cent below the 1968/9 level. 
With a price fall of 40 per cent, the IRR drops to 20 per cent. In the event, 
between 1969 and 1974 alone the 'real' price of Kenyan tea fell by 33 per cent 
(relative to the average prices of Kenyan imports). Table 3 gives estimates 
of the fall in the real price of tea from East Africa in terms of import 
purchasing power of a unit of tea exports. The rate of decline has definitely 
accelerated in recent years. Thus between 1964 and 1969, the real value to 
Kenya of exporting one tonne of tea fell by 10.5 per cent, but from 1969 to 
19 74 it fell by 33 per cent. 
It seems clear that an ITA which could stop or reverse this price trend 
without imposing too severe restrictions on the growth of the East African 
industry would be desirable. Moreover, the importance to East Africa of the 
loss of foreign exchange implied by these falling prices has Increased in 
recent years as East Africa's balance of payments problems have grown more 
acute. 
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Table 3, Changes in the real import purchasing power of unit tea exports 
from East Africa, 1964-1974. 
Kenya Uganda Tanzania 
Year 1. 2. 3. a 1. 2. 3. 1. 2. 3. 
real 
unit unit value 
value value of unit 
of tea of tea 
exports imports exports 
1964 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1969 94 105 89.5 81 104 77. 9 90 106 84.9 
1970 99 115 86.1 87 119 73. 1 94 105 89 .5 
1971 97 124 78.2 86 125 68. 8 92 110 83.6 
1972 95 135 70.4 84 151 55. 6 91 138 65.9 
1973 119 150 79.3 79 189 41. 8 87 160 54.4 
1974 145 241.5 60.0 
% changes in real unit value 
1964-69 10.5 22. 1 15.1 
1969-74 (73) 33.0 (46. 3) (35.9) 
a. Col. 3 = (Col 1/Col 2) x 100. 
Sources; Derived from the Economic and Statistical Review of the East 
~ African Community, March 1975 , and Annual Report for the year 
ending 30/6/75 of the Central Bank of Kenya. 
Table 4 shows the deterioration in Kenya's balance of payments up to 
1974,when the rise in oil prices generated a massive rise in the import bill. 
The balance of trade in 1975 showed no significant improvement. 
Table 4. Recent development of the Kenyan j^conomy. 
1972 
G.D.P. at constant factor cost (Sh. mill.) 10,948 
Per cent change in G.D.P, 6.8 
Current account deficit on the balance of - 486 
payments 
Current account deficit as a per cent of 
G.D.P. 3.4 
19 73 
11,718 
7.0 
- 950 
5.8 
1974 
12,144 
3.6 
- 2322 
12.2 
Source: Central Bank of Kenya^ Annual Report for the year ending 30/6/75. 
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In 1972 Stern, on surveying the environment in which the tea 
planting project was to be assessed, could write:-
The balance of payments' current account has been, roughly, in 
balance over the last few years and since Kenya can expect a 
continuation of the net inflow on long term capital account it 
cannot be said that she has a severe balance of payments problem..,. 
(13, p, 97) 
Another commentator in 1976 suggested that, "Since 1974, economic growth in 
Kenya has been constrained by the need to arrest the rapid deterioration in the 
balance of payments," (1) With Kenya's tea exports at 12.8 per cent of total 
exports in 1972, 10.2 per cent in 1973, and 9.2 per cent in 1974 (2), a substantial 
rise in the real price of tea could represent a significant easing of any balance 
of payments constraint on growth and on employment creation. 
Improving quality, while making East Africa's tea readily saleable, 
is no guarantee against falling real prices. If the past decline in price can 
reasonably be expected to continue, then some form of ITA may be the only means 
to sustain the profitability of tea production. 
PROJECTIONS FOR THE TEA INDUSTRY; AN ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
The IL0 Mission to Kenya did conclude that a compromise ITA should 
be possible from which all exporters would benefit:-
It could be argued that it would be in Kenya's interest, as a 
small producer, to ignore such agreements because she could 
expand her own output rapidly without much effect on world 
prices. Since both crops (tea and coffee) are labour intensive, 
the temptation to do this appears strong. We believe it should 
be rejected.... Kenya would certainly suffer.,, if her example 
encouraged other producers to act in the same way, and there 
were no limits at all on exports .... What Kenya is entitled to 
argue is that all producing countries should share in the benefit 
o.o. This implies that small and more recent producers such as 
Kenya would be accorded quotas rising more rapidly than those 
of the big producers, and that quotas should not be based on 
historical market shares. (9, pp, 28 8-289) 
To examine the scope and requirements of a mutually acceptable ITA, 
a very simple econometric model of the International trade in tea has been 
estimated for the period 1952 to 1973. The details of the model are set out 
in Appendix Two, It must be stressed, however, that the model is very crude. 
It consists of export equations for 6 supplying regions and import equations 
for 38 consuming regions. Price elasticities of supply and demand were either 
- 1+ - IDS/DP 255 
directly estimated or taken from other sources and 'fitted' into the equations. 
Prices were then estimated as those which brought projected supply and demand 
into equilibrium in each year. At best, all the model can really do is to 
answer the questions; if the recent trends in imports and exports continue 
are they likely to lead to a significant excess or deficit of supply or demand, 
and roughly what sort of price change would be necessary to restore equilibrium 
in the short run? With the estimates of future prices that the model provides, 
we can attempt to estimate the revenue implications for tea producers of doing 
nothing or of establishing various possible ITAs, 
The Outlook for Tea with no ITA 
Table 5 gives projections of prices and exports based on past trends, 
including the trends in Indian consumption and production. 
Average Price (p/Kg, in 1975 terms) 
1975 
108.4 
1980 
110,5 
1985 
108.4 
Indian Production (tonnes) 447,920 486 ,223 542,313 
Indian Consumption (tonnes) 331,364 461,549 661,619 
Exports (tonnes) 
In dia 116 ,556 26,674 -119 ,306 
Sri Lanka 225,276 226,912 242,730 
Indonesia 37,478 38,126 39 ,381 
Kenya 61,728 108,2 35 193,551 
'East Africa'3 136 ,331 223,795 374,269 
Export Revenue (£m) 
India 129.5 27. 8 -132.4 
Sri Lanka 258.8 264.8 278,7 
Indonesia 35.8 37.1 37. 8 
Kenya 70.0 124.8 219,5 
'East Africa'3 137.5 229.3 377.5 
a. 'East Africa' includes Uganda, Tanzania,Malawi , Mauritius, Mozambique 
and Argentina as these formed one region of the model. 
The results support the hypothesis of Etherington that falling exports from 
India due to rising consumption could stabilise the price of tea in the medium 
term, implying that an ITA would not be essential for East Africa. However the 
implication of this projection is that by 1981 India would be a net importer 
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of tea. It is doubtful whether the Indian Government would ever allow 
domestic consumption to expand so rapidly as to induce significant imports of 
tea. Moreover, in recent years India has given priority to increasing 
production, and has tried to restrain consumption via excise taxes. As a 
result, since the early 1970s production has accelerated above projected rates 
and export levels have been maintained so that, while the projection for Indian 
exports in 1975 was 116,000 tonnes, in fact exports were sustained at around 
the 200,000 tonne mark. 
Since the early 1960s Indian exports have been kept at around 200,000 
tonnes despite the diverging trends of consumption and production, and this 
suggests that in practice the domestic market will be residual rather than the 
export market, and that India will continue to maintain its level of exports. 
The projections were therefore recalculated on the more realistic basis of 
assuming constant Indian exports of 200,000 tonnes, and the results are set 
out in Table 6. The outcome expected now is one of continued fall in the real 
price of tea. 
Table 6, Projections based on India maintaining exports of 200,000 tonnes. 
1975 1980 1985 
Average Price (p/Kg. in 1975 terms) 81,6 66.6 55.3 
Indian Production 499,164 579,49 5 6 76,301 
Indian Consumption 299,164 379,495 476,301 
Exports (tonnes) 
India 200 ,000 200,000 200 ,000 
Sri Lanka 205 ,356 213,955 224 ,412 
Indonesia 35 ,188 35 ,489 35 ,786 
Kenya 57 ,188 98,376 170 ,092 
East Africa' 126 ,884 204 ,72 7 332 ,028 
World 723 ,409 861,917 1,084 ,450 
Export Revenue (£m) 
India 161,6 127.6 101,9 
Sri Lanka 181,5 157,7 140,3 
Indonesia 26.9 23,1 20,6 
Kenya 50,1 71,9 106.1 
'East Africa' 100,4 137,1 191.9 
World 590,3 574,0 599,6 
Some observers have hoped that because demand for tea is growing 
rapidly in many developing countries, they will become responsible for an ever 
larger share of world imports, so that total world demand will grow fast enough 
- 12 - IDS/DP 255 
to absorb the likely increase in supply without the need for any further 
fall in priceso Table 7 shows how the faster growth of imports into 
developing countries in the post-war years has increased their share of 
total world imports. 
Table Shares in world iropp_Pts_ for consumption. 
Year U „ K „ an d 
Ireland 
Rest of 
Europe 8 
U.S.S.R. 
N. Ameri ca, 
West Indies 
& Oceania 
Latin America, 
Asia, Africa, 
& Producing 
Countries3 
1938 
1947 
1950 
1955 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1973 
19 74 
, 517 
,520 
, 442 
,467 
„ 444 
,418 
e 381 
,295 
,315 
.103 
,054 
,055 
,072 
,099 
,125 
,101 
,133 
,129 
,204 
,227 
,282 
,206 
,204 
,19 7 
,179 
,205 
,204 
,176 
,200 
,221 
,255 
,253 
,260 
,3 39 
,366 
,357 
a, The chief producing country which imports tea is Japan, which became 
a net importer in 1966, 
Source: derived from the International Tea Committee, Annual Bulletin of 
Statistics, 
In fact, imports of tea by Latin America, Asia, Africa and producing 
countries rose from 70,300 tonnes in 1947 to 249,800 tonnes in 1974 (50,000 
tonnes more than U,K, imports), a growth rate of 4,8 per cent per annum. 
However, as we have seen, if India does succeed in maintaining her exports 
then this rapid growth of demand in other developing countries will not be 
enough to absorb the very large increase in output which Kenya anc 'East 
Africa' will achieve, if recent trends continue, without a continuing fall 
in the real price of tea. 
It has been argued (see Elz, 4, for example) that tea has reached, 
or is close to reaching, floor price, at which increasing bankruptcy among 
Asian producers will curtail output sufficiently to prevent further price 
falls. If this were the case, then obviously the past decline in prices cannot 
simply be extrapolated into the future, However, there is evidence to suggest 
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that a large economic 'surplus' is still earned from Asian production. In the 
case of Sri Lanka, this goes chiefly to the government in the form of indirect 
taxes on tea exports. In 1974 taxes averaging 28 per cent of the Colombo auction 
price, gross of rebates, were levied on tea exports (derived from the International 
Tea Committee's Annual Bulletin of Statistics). Moreover, tea export revenues 
are exchanged for local currency at,an overvalued exchange rate under a dual 
exchange rate system, so that a further substantial tax is implicitly levied on 
tea. Since the government now owns the tea estates in Sri Lanka, it would be 
rational to subsidise production for export as long as overall tax and profit 
yield exceeds the subsidy, providing of course that resources used for tea 
n • i 
production could not earn a greater return in other activities. Thus while 
low prices may prevent a significant expansion of Asian production by failing 
to provide enough additional funds for investment, In the medium-term future 
they would probably not cause a major fall in exports. 
The projection of a continuing surplus of supply over demand only 
® • •" • ©snsrib v'ii; <53 sisiox/bosq isrlto to sanogaa*! art* bos 'ioi bmm b repeats the results obtained from earlier studies by the World Bank and 
•s t bfismab lo ^IxaxtaBls srfj worf yisj-smxxoaqqs 993 neo ew airf} ani U, 
UNCTAD. (4- and 14) Our model does have an explicit price adjustment mechanism, 
!.-.' ad± al ,r>op-isq iBw-J-soq adt -isvo bv<j.n-jv*f> aerf bm* a'b.-hjsJ iig bns hib.3 however, and so it is capable of assessing the revenue implications of various . yidvxfcfaqasi a bos 3 baoubo'iq <«t9w 2S.Q ba& £ .0- lo sstesiidras .lab m ITA schemes. 
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Table 6 showed that Kenya, and 'East Africa' can, even without an ITA, 
increase their total export revenue from tea because their projected rate of 
export growth exceeds the projected rate of price decline. Therefore, the 
questions for East Africa are whether or not an ITA will bring about even 
higher revenues, and whether or not East African participation in any ITA is 
necessary for its success. 
The Possibility of a Unilateral Export Restriction Scheme 
Clearly, if African participation in an ITA w'ere1 nbt-''d-'necessary;- 1 
condition for its'success ', then these smaller produbfers>'Wbu3?d 'gkin tnost by letting 
India and^SM Laftka restrict" exports iirtilateraily 'and' s'o1 rai&!eJ!dll <tfea -prices, 
while' suffering no restraint on "irheir own produCtioil, !- Y':f ataoqxa b9j~o>r- q 
nsrl; 910m ^d aaii saoxiq ii /ioxjoe IsaeTBlif u sidi yd. aun&ven lisrL saBMonx y_l.: :> 
iHafe»&fee --iSiefij? exportq I 
re venue' by cutting back their exports un 11 ate ral ly I f, together, they aldi f 
facaW^'jsri&e their tea. "One- approximate measure of i. 
the' price elasticity of demahd for one producer's ;product "ih! a homogeneous 
market is given in equation (lj below, with a simp le proof presented iri"; •'• 
Appendix 0ne.''; '  ' n o 1 s r t^oqx& IIb zs wollol 1IJ * 
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where: E. is the price elasticity of demand for the tea from country ;'. 
E is the price elasticity of demand for the world's tea as a w 
whole 
e
rvfis the price elasticity of supply of tea from all other 
countries 
l< i is the share in world exports of country i's tea 
k is the share in world exports of all other countries' tea rw 
(1-k.). 
Thus the elasticity of demand for the tea of India and Sri Lanka taken 
together depends on their share of the market, the overall world elasticity of 
demand for tea, and the response of other producers to any change in price. 
Using this equation, we can see approximately how the elasticity of demand for 
India and Sri Lanka's tea has developed over the post-war period. In the tea 
model, estimates of -0,3 and 0,25 were produced for E^ and e ^ respectively. 
Thus for 1950:-
SI8SL ' - 3 ' 'I" - -2> = — 7 5 , 
while for 1973 E ^ = ' = _.7132, 
,572 
Clearly, over the period the gain to India and Sri Lanka from 
unilateral export restriction has declined as their market share has declined. 
Looking to the future , the model was used to estimate the percentage rise in 
price that would follow in any one year if India and Sri Lanka reduced their 
projected exports by 1 per cent in that year. Clearly India and Sri Lanka can 
only increase their revenue by this unilateral action if prices rise by more than 
1 per cent, i.e., if the price elasticity of demand for their tea is low. 
Table 8 sets out the results for the period up to 1985, and shows how by 1982 
India and Sri Lanka will have lost their joint ability to gain by export 
restriction on their own because of the continued decline of their market 
share. For comparison, Table 8 also shows the substantial price rise that 
will follow if all exporters cut back by 1 per cent on projected
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levels in any one year. 
Table 8,. Response of price_to_export restriction, 
% rise in price of % rise in world 
Sri Lanka tea following average price following 
Year 1% export cut by India a universal 1% export cut 
& Sri Lanka 
1975 1,49 3.59 
1976 1.41 3. 80 
1977 1.31 3,76 
1978 1.24 3.68 
19 79 1.16 3.58 
1980 1.08 3.48 
1981 1.01 3.38 
19 82 .93 3.27 
1983 . 88 3.20 
1984 . 82 3.13 
19 85 .76 3.05 
Thus there is no expectation that India and Sri Lanka will set up a 
unilateral export restriction scheme in the event of the continued failure 
of negotiations for a full ITA, The implication is that African co-operation 
is essential. It is misleading therefore to argue that small producers can 
expand production without much affecting prices, as implied by the standard 
equation (1), because that decision - to join an ITA and restrain export 
growth or not to join and place no restraint on exports - will determine 
whether or not an international attempt is made to regulate prices. So despite 
their relatively small share of the market, African tea producers have in fact 
a large degree of control over what the price of tea will be in the future. 
Possible ITA Schemes 
Three schemes were analysed having in common the assumed objective of 
2 
maintaining prices at lllp/kg. ( in 19 75 price terms) which is around the 19 70 
level, and achieving this by means of a global restraint on export growth. 
The differences between the schemes rest on how the global quota is distributed 
amongst participating countries. 
2. In fact prices at the London auctions had risen to around this level in 
mid-1976, as a result of unplanned restraints on supply due to continuing drought 
in East Africa and smaller shipments to London of tea from Sri Lanka. The ITA 
schemes outlined can therefore be seen as the means to sustain this new price level 
in real terms on a surer basis. 
- 1+ - IDS/DP 255 
Table 9, Price stabilisation with 1972-based quotas, 
A, The 1972 Position 
Exports Export 
Shares 
Estimated 
Revenue 
India 209 ,814 ,305 175.3 
Sri Lanka 190,088 ,276 168,4 
Indonesia 38,529 .056 28.8 
Kenya 47 ,368 .069 40,2 
'East Africa' 90,922 .132 69,9 
B, The Quota Scheme 1975 1980 1985 
Average price (p/Kg, 1975 terms) 110,8 110,8 110. 8 
World export quota (tonnes) 665 ,900 741,936 864,402 
World export revenue (£m) 738,0 822.2 958,1 
National Quotas (tonnes) 
India 20 3 ,100 226 ,290 263,642 
Sri Lanka 183 ,788 204 ,774 238,575 
Indonesia 37 ,290 41,548 48,407 
Kenya 45,947 51,194 59,644 
' East Africa' 87,899 97,936 114,101 
Export Revenue (£m) 
In dia 231,2 257.6 300.1 
Sri Lanka 215,4 240,0 279,6 
Indonesia 36,2 40.4 47,0 
Kenya 53,1 59,2 69,0 
' East Africa' 90,4 106.8 117,4 
With the overall world demand for tea inelastic in terms of price, 
there is of course a substantial global gain from all three schemes. By 
1985 without any global restraint world exports are projected at 1,084,000 
tonnes, and revenue is £599,600,000, With restraint, exports rise to only 
864,402 tonnes, but revenue becomes £958,100,000, Thus a 20,3 per cent 
cut-back in world exports In 1985 achieves a 100,7 per cent rise in the 
average world price and a 59,8 per cent increase in world export revenue, 
A Scheme Based on Historical Shares.' Table 9 sets out the distri-
bution of the global quota on the basis of 1972 shares in world exports. 
This confirms the view of Etherington that East Africa would not benefit from 
such a scheme. Indeed because the restraint on Africa's export growth would be 
so severe (compared with actual 1974 exports , Kenya would be allowed an annual 
export growth of 0.5 per cent from 1974 to 1978 and 3.1 per cent from 1980 to 
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1985), less export revenue would be earned under the scheme than without it. 
Without the scheme projected earnings are £106,100,000 and £191,900,000 for 
Kenya and^East Africa' respectively; with the scheme these fall to £69,000,000 
and £117,400,000, This confirms that an ITA based on historical market shares 
would not attract widespread participation. 
A Scheme Based on Projected Shares: The opposite extreme Is to set 
quotas relative to what market shares would be, were there no ITA, as projected 
by the model and given in Table 6. Thus, whereas in the scheme based on 
historical shares Kenya's share of the global quota is fixed at 6.9 per cent, 
in a scheme based on projected shares Kenya is allowed a share rising to 11.4 
per cent by 1980 and 15.7 per cent by 1985, and her exports can thus grow by 
9.2 per cent per annum from 1974 to 1980, and 9.9 per cent per annum from 1980 
to 1985. As a result, Kenya's revenue is projected to rise to £157,100,000 by 
1985 , and 4East Africa^ to £272,100,000, as shown in Table 10. This gives Kenya 
48 per cent and 'East Africa' 42 per cent greater revenue than the level projected 
with no ITA. 
However, while India and Sri Lanka are still net gainers from this 
scheme, because of their rapidly falling quota shares, these countries are 
still required to steadily reduced their absolute level of exports. This may 
prove unacceptable, especially given the existing high levels of unemployment 
and under-employment amongst the tea estate labour force in Asia. 
Compromise Scheme: One possible intermediate scheme would be to allow 
Asian producers to keep their exports constant at current levels (200,000 tonnes 
each for India and Sri Lanka and 30,000 tonnes for Indonesia) and let the newer 
producers share all of the natural expansion of demand for tea in proportion 
to their relative expected market shares were there no ITA. Such a scheme is 
depicted in Table 11. For Kenya this still allows export growth of 6.9 per 
cent per annum from 1974 to 1980 and 9.8 per cent per annum from 1980 to 1985, 
while export revenue in 1985 is 29.3 per cent above projected levels without 
the ITA. For'East Africa'revenue is up by 23.6 per cent. 
Of course, in reality, any compromise scheme can only be determined 
by specific bargaining amongst potential members. Nevertheless, the examples 
given do indicate the widespread scope that exists for a mutually beneficial 
agreement between both the traditional and the newer producers. 
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Table 10 < Price stabilisa.tion with J^oj^ctsd market shares, 
1975 19 80 1985 
National QuotasS Quota shares () 
India 
Sri Lanka 
Indonesia 
Kenya 
'East Africa' 
183,788 (.276) 
189,116 (0 284 ) 
32,629 (,049) 
52,606 (,079) 
116,532 (,175) 
172,129 (,232) 
184,000 (,248) 
30,419 (,041) 
84,581 (.114) 
176,581 (.238) 
159,050 (,184) 
178,931 (,207) 
28,525 (,033) 
135,711 (.157) 
264,507 (,306) 
Export Revenue (£m) 
India 209,2 196.0 180,9 
Sri Lanka 221.7 215,7 209,7 
Indonesia 31,6 29,6 27,7 
Kenya 60,9 93.3 157,1 
'East Africa' 119,9 181.6 272,1 
Table 11. Price stabilisation with constant Asian exports, 
National Quotas & Quota Shares () 1975 19 80 19 85 
India 200,000 (,300) 200,000 200,000 (.231) 
Sri Lanka 200,000 (,300) 200,000 200,000 (.231) 
Indonesia 30,000 (,045) 30 ,000 30,000 (.035) 
Kenya 47,888 ( c 072 ) 74,241 118,592 (,137) 
'East Africa1 105,919 (,159) 155,032 230,667 (,267) 
Export Revenue (£m) 
India 
Sri Lanka 
Indonesia 
Kenya 
'East Africa' 
227,7 
227,7 
29,1 
55.4 
108,9 
227.7 
227,7 
29,1 
85,9 
159.5 
227.7 
227,7 
29,1 
137, 3 
2 37.3 
Possible Disadvantages of an ITA 
While the available evidence may suggest that East Africa can increase 
her income and export revenue from tea production via a suitable ITA, the 
possibility remains that an ITA may have adverse repercussions on other national 
objectives, It could be argued that the need to limit the growth of tea production 
will generate a trade-off between income and employment creation. If the government's 
prime objective is job creation, then participation in an ITA may be rejected. 
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Clearly reducing the rate of growth of tea output will reduce the 
number of potential jobs in tea production, but this is only one part of 
the total employment picture. We have already touched on the possibility 
that currently the chief constraint on growth — and so on general employment 
creation •— isthe balance of payments problem. While not readily quantifiable, 
a relaxing of this constraint via an ITA should allow additional job creation 
in the economyi Secondly, the land which would not be planted under tea 
because of an ITA could be put to some alternative use. In the case of Kenya, 
Stern reports that maize is the crop most likely to be grown instead of tea, 
and maize also requires considerable labour input, (13) Stern found that 
maize cultivation produces a satisfactory economic return to land by prevailing 
standards, and so land not used for tea as a result of an ITA would probably 
generate substantial levels of income and employment under maize, even though 
not as high as if it were used for tea production. Finally, the consequences 
for employment of the additional income generated under an ITA must also be 
considered,, Taking the year 1985 as an example, under the compromise scheme 
outlined in Table 11, Kenya's total revenues from tea exports (yielding higher 
incomes to small-holders, workers- and companies and higher government revenues) 
would be 29 per cent higher than they would be without an ITA, but export 
quantity (and so, roughly, employment) would be 30 per cent lower. Even 
ignoring the alternative use of the land which would have been put under tea 
and the effect on the balance of payments constraint, the additional 30 per 
cent expenditure by the tea sector would generate extra employment in sectors 
outside tea — and also generate extra income which in turn will be spent and 
so generate further employment. It is not unreasonable to expect that this 
multiplier process, stemming from an increase in export earnings, could 
generate significant levels of employment, provided that the marginal 
propensity to import is not excessive. 
Gwyer has suggested that, "Export restriction agreements of the coffee, 
tea and sisal type will, for countries like East Africa which have industries 
set to grow under a wide range of prices, inevitably entail a reduction in 
agricultural employment," (8, p, 466) We can now question the inevitability of 
even this adverse consequence of an ITA, Given, as in the case of Kenya, 
fairly high marginal propensities to consume food out of additional income and 
a high degree of agricultural self-sufficiency, it is conceivable that the 
multiplier process generated by higher tea revenues, and the alternative 
use of lands earmarked for tea, will stimulate agricultural production and 
thereby agricultural employment leaving the net rural employment effect 
uncertain. Clearly, more work is required to establish with any degree of 
certainty the actual employment consequences of any specific ITA, but the 
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assumption of a necessary decrease can be strongly challenged on several 
grounds. 
A further potential disadvantage of an ITA to East Africa may be the 
political consequences of imposing restrictions on small-holder tea production. 
One researcher in the late 1960s noted that in Kenya, "We found an almost 
universal desire among farmers to plant more tea". (de Wilde, 3) Etherington 
has noted that during the 1960s:-
A major constraint on the rate of growth of the area under tea 
was the availability of planting material from the large centralised 
nurseries of the Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA). The 
introduction of vegetatively propogated (VP) stumps has not only 
removed the seedling constraint but opened a potential floodgate 
of 1illegal' planting. (5, p. 90) 
While of course the KTDA can still control realised output through its control 
of factories and marketing, there may clearly be political problems in restrain-
ing farmers from cultivating a very profitable crop if planting material is 
readily available. 
Opposition may also be expected from many of the private tea companies 
which still produce the bulk of East Africa's tea, As Etherington again points 
out, "The tea industry in East Africa was, for the most part, established by 
British tea companies with considerable experience of tea estates ... in India 
and Ceylon," (5,p.89) The prime motivation for the movement of these companies 
into East Africa was the high taxes and political uncertainty that came with 
the political independence of the Asian countries. For many tea companies, 
profitability and long-run security have been maintained by concentrating on 
expanding production in East Africa and sometimes selling off Asian estates. 
We have already noted the higher profitability of African production both 
before and after taxes. An ITA which slowed down the rate of the transfer 
of production from Asia to Africa would be clearly contrary to the strategy 
that many tea companies have followed in the post-war period, Moreover, if 
governments react to increased tea prices achieved under an ITA with higher 
excise and profits taxes, then the companies may see very little of the gains 
from an ITA. They may also fear that any overall constraint on production 
growth will be weighted against them so as to minimise the constraint on 
small-holder production. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
If we consider tea as a homogeneous commodity, then it does 
not make any sense to ask what is the effect of demand for, say, India's 
tea if the price of India's tea rises, because for a homogeneous good there 
can only be one price, and the price of India's tea could not change unless 
the price of all tea changes. It does make sense, however, to seek the 
inverse of the price elasticity of demand for one country's tea, that is, the 
effect on the general price level of one country changing the quantity of tea 
it supplies. The change in price will obviously depend on the size of the 
change in supply, the overall world price elasticity of demand for tea in 
general, and the effect any change in price has on the supply from other 
countries. 
Thus if %A = percentage change in 
q = world demand 
p = price of all tea 
E = world price elasticity of demand w 
q^ = supply of tea from country I 
q = supply of tea from all other countries rw J 
= price elasticity of demand for tea from 
country i 
6rw ~ Pr:'"ce elasticity of supply of tea from all 
other countries 
k. = the share in world exports of country i's tea 
k = the share in world exports of all other rw 
countries' tea, 
then: 
%Ap = %Aq. x k . x - + -oA q x k x -* i l E rw rw E w w 
which simply states that the change in price depends on world price elasticity 
of demand and the various quantity changes that take place. To determine E^ 
let an exogenous change in q. take place. Whatever price change follows will 
cause to change. The change is determined by:— 
%Ap x e rw . 
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APPENDIX TWO 
The simple model of the trade in tea which has been used is designed 
to determine all imports and exports only by the average London price of tea 
and time. This means that the equilibrium price of tea for any year can be 
forecast as that price which ensures total import demand just equals total 
available exports. 
The time trends are clearly a simplification of many factors affecting 
exports and imports. The trend in exports represents the combined effects of 
assumed steady trends in the productivity of existing estates and small-
holdings, and in the extension of acreage. The import trend covers the effect 
of rising incomes and populations and changing tastes on tea eensumptien. 
The structure of the model is thus 
Exports: = 1 (P. , T) (1) it f i ,t-l 
where X^ = exports from region i in year t 
P. = the real price at the London auctions of tea from 
region i 
T = time in years. 
Thus exports this year are viewed as being determined by last year's prices 
on the basis that producers respond to price changes with about a one-year 
lag. 
Prices: P. = f 2 (P ) (2) it t 
where P = the London average price for all teas. 
Thus we relate all separate tea prices to the one average, and so we can 
rewrite (1) as:-
X i t = f l ( f 2 ( Pt-l }' T )° ( 3 ) 
Imports: M = f 3 (Pt, T) (4) 
where ^jt = ^ mP o : r t s i n t o country j in year t; 
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stocks; dS = f (P , P ) (5) uk,t t f l 
where ~ c^anSe level °f U.K. stocks. 
Thus the change in the level of U.K. stocks depends on how prices have been 
moving in the recent past, with, In fact, stocks rising as prices fall,, 
Equations (1) and (4) for exports and imports were estimated in 
logarithmic form, thus price coefficients represent elasticities of supply 
and demand and the time trends are assumed to be exponential. 
Altogether, the model has export equations for 6 supplying regions, 
and import equations for 37 countries and the 'rest of the world'. This 
degree of disaggregation allows average world trends in supply and demand 
to change over time, and so allows the trend in real prices to change. 
In the cases of India and Japan, exports and imports depend on the 
difference between production and consumption, both of which have strong 
trends. In these two cases therefore, we estimated equations both for output 
and consumption and then derived exports as a residual. 
The export, price and stocks equations were directly estimated by 
ordinary least squares (OLS), but the import equations were derived from 
various existing estimates of the price-elasticity of demand for tea in 
several countries. These estimates were used as a guide to the probable price 
elasticity of demand in other similar countries. The estimates were then 
incorporated into the overall import equations. 
The underlying relationship was assumed to be:-* 
log M, = a' - Bflog P + Cf T (6) j t t t 
where B? is the estimate of the price-elasticity of demand. 
By OLS an estimate of price through time was derived?-
• • 1 
log P = a*' + k T + u (7) & t t t 
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where u is an error term with mean = zero. 
Thus an estimate of (6) is given by-
log M = af - B'a" - b'u + (C' - B'k) T (8) 5 ]t t t 
By OLS an estimate was made of:. 
A A 
log M = a + CT . (9) 31 t 
Thus C is an estimate of (C' - B'k) and so C' is estimated by 
C + B' k. 
Substituting in (6), an estimate of a1 Is given by;-
a' = log M. + B' log P - (C + B' k) T (10) jt t t 
where the superscription'symbolises mean value 
and thus are derived estimates of all the parameters of the import 
equation (6). 
Tables 12 and 13 present the trends and price elasticities that 
were used in the projections, giving alternatives where these were tried. 
Thus for developing countries an average price elasticity of demand for 
imports of -.54- was taken, while for developed countries an average of 
about -.2 was used. Some further evidence in support of these estimates 
was provided by a subsequent Ordinary Least Squares estimation of the 
import demand functions for 16 developed and 2 3 developing countries, in 
the form of equation (6) above. As expected, given the crude specification 
and the complexity of the real relationships, many estimates were neither 
significant nor sensible. However, for 11 developed and 10 developing 
countries , estimates of the price elasticity of demand lying between 0 and 
-1 were obtained, and of these, the average for developed countries was -,22, 
and for developing countries was -,45, The significance of these 
results is difficult to interpret, but they are at least consistent with the 
orders of magnitude used in the model. 
There are many obvious weaknesses in the model. Firstly, exports are 
not determined only by last year's price and an autonomous trend. Trend itself 
is affected by long-run price movements, while short-run changes in exports 
can be caused by current price fluctuations,Similarly, demand cannot be fully 
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explained by one average price and a trend; Incomes, population the price 
of different types of tea and of other drinks are all important. In all 
countries, export and import duties, retail taxes and subsidies disturb the 
relationship between the consumers' and producers' tea prices and the price 
at London auctions„ Moreover, while dominant, the London auction is not the 
only auction—most large exporters have their own auctions where prices do 
not always move precisely parallel with London prices. The price elasticity 
of demand estimates that were borrowed were not produced on a uniform basis. 
Some relate to real prices, others to money prices; some to retail prices, 
others to auction prices. In the model they were simply lumped together 
assuming that they were approximately correct for a system using only real 
London auction prices. Further, these elasticities are assumed constant, 
but it is generally recognised that the price elasticity of demand for tea 
falls as income rises. 
This does not exhaust the list of weaknesses, but it is already clear 
that the projections based on the model must be treated with great caution. 
However, because it is simple, the model is fairly robust, and providing that 
the estimates of the price elasticities of demand are of the right order of 
magnitude, then given the continuation of import and export trends the 
projections should provide a rough guide to possible future developments in 
the world tea economy. 
Table 12. Supply parameters of the model. 
Region 
Price-elasticity 
of supply 
Underlying trend in 
exports: % p,a. 
India 
Sri Lanka 
Indonesia 
Kenya 
' East Africa ' 
Rest of World 
0o000 
0.253 
0,196 
0,227 
0,225 
0.309 
2.3 (output) 
2.0 
0.5 
12.4 
10.9 
3.0 
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Table 13„ Demand parameters of the model0 
Country Actual rate Estimated price Deduced 
of growth of elasticity of underlying 
importsj1963 demand trend in 
- 1972 % p.a. imports 
% p.a. 
low high 
„ a Australia - 1.2 -.13 -.94 - 1.65 / 
USSR 4.3 -.30 3.25 
New Zealand - 0.2 -.13 -.94 - 0.65 / 
U.K.3 - 1.9 0.00 -.33 - 1.9 / 
Yugoslavia 11.5 -.50 9.75 
Switzerland 2.8 -.20 2.1 
Sweden 5.9 -.20 5.2 
Spain 12.1 -.50 10.35 
Norway 5.3 -.20 4.6 
Belgium 6.4 -.20 5.7 
Poland 9.5 -.30 8.45 
Netherlands - 1.3 -.20 - 2.0 
Italy 3.0 -.30 1.98 
Ireland3 1.1 -.14 0.61 
West Germany 2.5 -.20 1.8 
France 8.1 -.20 7.4 
Denmark 4.7 -.20 4.0 
Czechoslovakia - 3.1 -.30 - 4.42 
Syria 1.2 -.54° - 0.69 
Lebanon 24.4 -.54° 22.51 
Jordan 7.5 -. 54C 5.61 
Japan (output) (2.3) (2.3) 
(consump.) (4.2) -.30 (3.1) 
Israel 13.3 -.30 12.25 
Iraq 1.1 -.54° ri - 0.79 Iran 2.1 -.54 0.21 
Hong Kong 5.6 -.40 4.2 
Afghanistan 13.9 -.54 12.01 
Chile 5.0 -.40 3.6 
U.S.A.3 2.5 -.05 -.34 2.33 / 
Canada3 0.4 -.13 -0.055 
Tunisia -0.3 -.54° -2.19 
Sudan 7.3 -„ 54° 5.41 
South Africa 2.2 -.40 0.8 
Somalia 9.2 -.54° 7.31 
Moro cco 4.1 -.54c 2.21 
Lybia 14.0 -.54° 12.11 
Egypt a d -5.7 -.50 - 7.45 
India (consump.) (6.6) -.10 -.93 (6.66)/ 
Rest of World 
(62-71) 3.9 -.30 3.0 
Underlying 
trend if 
high elas. 
used 
-4.50 
-0.34 
-3.00 
1. 30 
(7.16) 
An estimate of price elasticity was available from external sources. 
Lebanon's import trend was revised down by 0.5% p.a. from 1973 on because its 
1960s growth rate is unmaintainable. 
The price elasticity estimate of -.54 for most developing countries was derived 
from a source giving this as the price elasticity of demand in Sri Lanka. 
To calculate India's underlying consumption trend, a Calcutta auction price 
series was used. 
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